November 2015
These days Iran views the Prime
Ministry of Mr. Haider al-Abadi as in contrast with its interests in Iraq. In
this regard Tehran has dispatched its proxy, former Iraqi premier Nouri
al-Maliki, to take on Mr. al-Abadi.
In the past few days reports
have been heard from inside the Iraqi government of an increase in Maliki’s
measures and plots against the al-Abadi government. Many political circles
believe Maliki, receiving orders from Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei,
intends to topple the al-Abadi government. In the beginning of November Maliki
held separate meetings with militia leaders aimed at gaining their support as
these groups have joined forces under the command of the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF).
On the other hand since Maliki
has no official political post he intends to declare his expulsion from the
vice presidency post by Prime Minister al-Abadi as illegal and gather the
support of militias behind his cause. Maliki’s objective is to establish a
coalition against al-Abadi for future developments in Iraq.
Tariq al-Harab, Maliki’s legal
advisor who for 8 years provided legal cover for Maliki’s illegal measures,
issued a statement on November 5th over the vice presidency posts:
“Revoking the post is part of the Prime Minister’s authority as he is the
official in charge of directly executing the government’s policies based on
article 78 of the constitution. However, expelling officials from their post is
under the authority of the President in based on Law #1 of 2011. Therefore,
this inflicted a significant blow to Maliki.
1. In the beginning of November
Maliki held secret separate meetings with leaders of known militia chiefs from
the Asaeb, Najba, 9th Badr Corps including Qeis Khazali, Akram Ka’bi
and Hadi Ameri, and the media never reported on these meetings. Moreover,
Maliki has held various meetings with a number of smaller militia groups, with
the goal of gaining their support for future measures against al-Abadi.
2. Based on the intelligence received
the focus of these discussions were on how to topple al-Abadi and his
government, and these meetings are attempting to pave the grounds for such
actions.
3. After restricting al-Abadi’s
reforms and placing a contingent on these measures to the Parliament, through
the State of Law and other representatives of associated parties Maliki is
attempting to impose his own hegemony over al-Abadi’s reforms. The Iraqi Prime
Minister has in response followed his own measures through the Marjaiya, or
supreme Shiite religious authority, leaders of political groups and the backing
of popular demonstrations to not allow the State of Law stop his reform plans
in the Parliament.
4. Militia leaders in their
meetings with Maliki have raised issues over the problems and restrictions
imposed on their forces by al-Abadi. Maliki is using the levers of the PMF and
al-Abadi’s own policies to further the divide between the militia groups and
the Iraqi Prime Minister. Maliki has in the past month on numerous occasions
expressed his support for the PMF and militia groups.
5. An element linked to the
Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq made the following remarks about Maliki’s
policies: “Maliki is investing on the PMF and militia groups. He is strongly
seeking to take control over their leadership and this is the only method for
his return to power.”
6. Maliki has enormous amounts
of money and his associates are still working in the ministries of interior and
defense. Therefore, through these levers he can act as a major barrier before al-Abadi’s
actions.
7. A member of the Asaeb al-Haq
Political Bureau by the name of Mehdi al-Hosseini made the following remarks
over al-Abadi’s policies: “To this day there has yet to be any mentioning of
officially evicting al-Abadi from the prime ministry post.
However, if he continues his political pertinacity he will be set aside from
the Prime Ministry post… the resistance front in Iraq and Asaeb al-Haq have yet
to reach such a conclusion to set Mr. al-Abadi aside from the prime ministry.
If al-Abadi continues his measures against the PMF, a change in the prime
ministry is possible and quite probable.”
“Al-Abadi’s
reforms was a mere brag and show off, and he has not been able to implement any
of his decisions because Maliki continues to welcome guests as the vice
president and refuses to hand over his office to the government,” he added.
8. Baha al-Araji, the representative
of the 9th Badr Brigade in the Iraqi Parliament, alluded in an
interview with the state-run al-Iraqiya TV on October 22nd referring
to Maliki’s measures against al-Abadi: “The National Alliance is completely
against the reforms because it does not see its interests in the reforms
advancing. Iran doesn’t want al-Abadi, and since it cannot take a firm stance
before al-Abadi he has resorted to other methods of stonewalling against the
Iraqi Prime Minister. Those individuals in the National Alliance that are close
to Iran are the main obstacles before the reforms.”
9. Al
Jazeera TV on November 5th cited a leader of Iraq’s Dawa Party saying
Maliki is seeking to launch a new project aimed at participating in the
provincial elections of 2017 and parliamentary elections in 2018. Arrangements
have been made for a preliminary meeting to be held on November 21st
for the leaders of a new elections list headed by Maliki dubbed the “al-Hashad
al-Moqadas” (Sacred Assembly) in Najaf, southern Iraq.
10. On
November 8th Maliki in Karbala referred to the fact that the
Parliament will not transfer his authority to al-Abadi. “Revoking the vice
presidency post is not legal. The Parliament has yet to evaluate this matter.
If the Parliament retrieved the authority transfer it means that all decisions
made must be evaluated… reforms must not be in contradiction with the law,” he
said.
11.
Evaluation
1) Maliki is
plotting and resorting to all his assets against al-Abadi and leading his
government into utter failure.
2) Maliki’s
measures and using militia groups and the PMF against al-Abadi’s policies,
taking place with full support provided by the Iranian regime, will lead to
al-Abadi being weakened.
3) If
al-Abadi is weakened it will allow the Iranian regime and Quds Force-linked
militia groups in Iraq to have a more open hand and al-Abadi will show no
reaction in the face of Tehran’s actions.
4) Since
the State of Law is mainly in support of Maliki, al-Abadi is seeking to form a
new coalition against the State of Law.
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